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Abstract 
The United States is a fascinating case study in the complex links between crime, punishment 
and inequality, standing out as it does in terms of inequality as measured by a number of 
economic standards; levels of serious violent crime; and rates of imprisonment, penal 
surveillance and post-conviction disqualifications. In this chapter, we build on previous work 
arguing that the exceptional rise in violent crime and punishment in the US from the mid 
1970s to the early 1990s could be explained by the interaction of four political and economic 
variables: ‘technological regime change’; ‘varieties of capitalism’ and ‘varieties of welfare 
state’; types of ‘political system’; and – critically and specifically – the US as a radical outlier 
in the degree of local democracy.  Here we ask three further questions implied by our previous 
work.  First, why did such distinctive patterns of local democracy arise in America? And to 
what extent is this political structure tied up with the history and politics of race? Second, 
what did the distinctive historical development of the US political economy in the 19th century 
imply for the structure of its criminal justice institutions? And third, why did the burden of crime 
and punishment come to fall so disproportionately on African Americans?  
 
Keywords: inequality, poverty, crime, punishment, local autonomy, race, segregation, 
American Exceptionalism 
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By any standards, the United States presents itself as a fascinating case study for a volume 
considering the complex links between crime, punishment and inequality.  Despite rich veins 
of relevant scholarship across a number of disciplines, each of these links, and the existence 
and direction of causal vectors between them, remain contested. But, broadly speaking, there 
is recognition of the fact that societies with high levels of inequality tend also to exhibit high 
levels of both crime – particularly violent crime – and punishment.  Most of the exemplary 
cases for this observation, however, feature one or more of two further features: an insecure 
and/or very recent embedding of a democratic political system; and the late and/or incomplete 
embedding of an ‘advanced’ capitalist economic system.  Amid longstanding democracies 
with advanced capitalist economies, the US stands out in terms of a number of key features: 
inequality as measured by a number of economic standards (Lindert & Williamson 2016; 
Pickett & Wilkinson 2009); levels of serious violent crime (Gallo et al. 2018; Roth 2009); 
imprisonment rates and rates of penal surveillance and post-conviction disqualifications 
(Enns 2016; Garland 2017; 2018; Lacey 2008; Reitz (ed.) 2018).  With a gini co-efficient of 
0.39 as compared with 0.35 in the United Kingdom (OECD 2019); a homicide rate 5 times 
that of the UK, and  at least  2.57   times higher than the OECD average (World Bank Group 
2017);2 an imprisonment rate which, even after a modest reduction over the last decade 
(Phelps & Pager 2016; Reitz 2018), still stands at over four times higher than those of other 
liberal market economies such as Scotland, England and Wales, New Zealand and Australia, 
the United States occupies the unenviable position of being an outlier, in all the wrong ways.  
And it is an outlier even among the more unequal, more criminogenic, and more punitive 
liberal market economies of the advanced democracies of which it has so often declared itself 
the leader. 
 
In previous work we have argued that the exceptional rise in violent crime and punishment in 
the US from the mid 1970s to the early 1990s could be explained by the interaction of four 
political and economic variables: ‘technological regime change’, in this case the collapse of 
the Fordism; ‘varieties of capitalism’ (Hall & Soskice 2001; Lacey 2008; Lacey et al. 2018) 
and ‘varieties of welfare state’ (Esping-Andersen 1990) – the US as liberal market economy 
and liberal welfare state; the ‘political system’ – the US as a competitive/majoritarian rather 
than negotiated/ proportional representation political system (Lipjhardt 1984; 1999); and – 
critically and specifically – the US as a radical outlier in the degree of local democracy, with 
policies on residential zoning, public education (kindergarten to year 12), policing, 
prosecution, justice and transportation, all decided directly or indirectly by local voters 
(Fischel 2001; 2014; Lacey & Soskice 2015; 2018). 
 
Our broad argument is that rising  violent crime came from the poverty, lack of welfare, limited 
education, and lack of effective policing, in the tracts into which zoning policies segregated 
                                                          
2
 World Bank Open data for individual OECD countries  for 2015 (or nearest available year) including the US 
produces a homicide rate of 1.93 (US included), implying that the US homicide rate is 2.57 times higher than 
the average.  Grinshteyn and Hemenway (2016) used data for 2010 from 24 OECD countries excluding the 
US and calculated the US rate to be 7 times higher than the non-US average. 
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the disadvantaged losers from the collapse of Fordism, policies which favoured median local 
voters by bolstering house prices and reducing property taxation (Gallo et al. 2018; Lacey & 
Soskice 2015; 2018; Miller 2016; 2018). And the very same dynamics shaped a distinctive, 
and toxic, politics of punishment, particularly from the 1970s on.  In particular, these 
electorally driven patterns of residential segregation reinforced and aggravated the radical 
racial inequality which is a further and striking feature of American history.  And while the 
over-representation of Black and Hispanic Americans in the criminal justice system echoes 
with comparable levels of racial disproportion in the prison systems of countries like New 
Zealand or England and Wales, there remain important differences in the American racial 
politics of crime and punishment which, we argue, relate specifically to the power of  American 
local politics (Peterson & Krivo 2010; Schneider & Turney 2015).  
 
Recent research in a number of disciplines has contributed to an accumulating evidential and 
theoretical base for our thesis.  The tendency of American political fragmentation to unleash 
‘centrifugal’, polarising forces has been identified by historians and political scientists (Gerstle 
2015: 154–5; King 2000; 2005; 2017; King & Smith 2005; 2011; Miller 2016); and the key 
impact of local democracy and locally based criminal justice institutions on the development 
of criminal justice policy has been confirmed in a range of broadly criminological work 
(Appleman 2017; Brown 2016; Campbell 2014; 2016; 2018; Verma 2016).  More specifically, 
many recent studies have confirmed the decisive impact of electoral cycles on both judicial 
and prosecutorial decision-making (Berdejó & Chen 2017; Nadel et al. 2017;  Park 2017). In 
most of these studies, the finding is that, under the conditions prevailing from the collapse of 
Fordism from the 1970s on, these electoral dynamics have fed an upward trajectory in 
punitiveness: indeed Pfaff (2017; see also Lynch 2018) has gone so far as to claim – on the 
basis of meticulous empirical analysis – that the single most important reform needed to make 
progress in dismantling mass imprisonment would be a move away from the election of 
prosecutors.  The impact, and changing patterns, of America’s exceptional levels of 
residential segregation, which we identified as a key mechanism through which local 
democracy had produced and maintained inequality in educational, economic and criminal 
justice spheres, continues to attract a great deal of notice in the social sciences (Ellen & Steil 
(eds) 2019; Sampson 2019; Schneider & Turney 2015; Smith 2012).  And both the 
longstanding phenomenon of unusually high American levels of inequality (Lindert & 
Williamson 2016) and failure to develop a comprehensive welfare state, as well as the 
correlation between inequality and ungenerous welfarism with changes in crime and 
punitiveness, particularly since the 1970s, has continued to attract the analytic efforts of 
criminologists, political scientists, sociologists and historians (Garland 2017; 2018; Hinton 
2016; Phelps & Pager 2016; Reitz (ed.) 2018; Roth 2009; 2018; Schoenfeld 2018; Tonry 
2018). 
 
As a result of this scholarship, we are gradually accumulating a better understanding of the 
cultural, institutional and political mechanisms through which the United States’ extraordinary 
outcomes in crime, punishment and inequality are being produced and maintained; and some 
promising hypotheses are emerging to explain how the distinctive American economic, 
political and social structure has produced these outcomes over time.  One thing which 
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emerges from this literature is the importance of history (Adler 2015; Campbell & Vaughn 
2018; Gottschalk 2006; Simon 2017).  For the institutions which shape these outcomes today 
are the products of long processes of historical development (Garland 2007; 2010; 2017).  A 
historical focus is, accordingly, important in developing our argument that America’s outlier 
position among contemporary advanced democracies is shaped decisively by its distinctively 
institutionalised political system.  In this paper, we therefore tackle this historical process, 
asking three questions implied by but only very partially covered in our previous work:  
   
First, we confront the fundamental question, why did such distinctive patterns of local 
democracy arise in America? And, in light of the over-representation of African-Americans in 
the criminal justice system, how is this political structure tied up with the distinctive American 
history and politics of race? Here we go back to the institutional strategy of the Republican 
Ascendency in the 1870s on to provide the framework for industrialisation, following on from 
the failure of Reconstruction of the South. Drawing on the work of Bensel (2000), Gerstle 
(2015) and Novak (1996) among others, we explain decentralisation of political power to 
major cities to provide non-unionised (largely immigrant) labor to the equally unconstrained 
and developing giant Chandlerian corporations, subject to Supreme Court interpretations of 
the Interstate Commerce clause and presidential interpretations of the Clayburn and 
Sherman competition legislation. (At the same time, the Republican Ascendency allowed the 
exclusion of the southern states, deeply hostile to industrialisation and its potentially 
transformative possibilities for African-Americans, but forcing the South to buy northern 
manufactures by prohibiting internal tariffs). We contrast the American experience with the 
very different British experience in which from a highly decentralised system in the early 19th 
century, British political leaders developed a highly centralised system (Cox 1987).  
 
Second, we ask what this political-economic history implied about the development of 
specifically criminal justice institutions. Both the American and the British criminal justice 
systems saw a process of modernisation during the 19th and early 20th centuries; but, 
refecting the broader political economy picture, the US system neither centralised nor 
professionalised to anything like the same extent as the systems of England and Wales or of 
Scotland. Here our approach complementary to Garland’s approach in discussing both 
capital punishment and the foundations of penal policy in the United States (2010, 2017, 
2018). 
 
Third, and equally fundamental, we ask: why has the burden of violent crime and punishment 
continued to fall so disproportionately on African-Americans?3 Drawing on King’s  (2000; 
2005; King & Smith 2005; 2011) work, we argue that, with cruel irony, the ‘original’ Americans 
and English-Irish-Northern European ‘first wave’ immigrants of the 19th century legislated 
tight immigration controls in the 1920s against the ‘second wave’ immigrants from Italy, 
                                                          
3
  The widespread, state-sanctioned violence against Native Americans by colonial settlers and their 
descendants of course provides a further and continuing example of what Lisa Miller has called ‘racialised 
state failure’ in the United States (Miller 2016).  In this section of the paper, we focus on the interaction 
between the history and politics of race and the politics of immigration from the late 19th century.  
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central Europe and Russian Jews, leading to the massive northern internal migration of about 
six million African Americans from the South over the 1920 to 1970 period to meet the huge 
industrial demand for semi-skilled labor. But why did they become ‘truly disadvantaged’ 
(Wilson 1987) in the northern cities, when the second generation of previous immigrant 
waves to those cities had become relatively integrated? We conclude tentatively and again 
ironically that the answer lies in the ‘two region’ solution adopted by the American political 
economy.  Southern state governments – absolved from industrialisation, and able to 
reinstitute forms of radical racial oppression even after the abolition of slavery (Aaronson 
2014) – prevented the education and development of political leadership of southern African-
Americans which would have been necessary – once they moved north from the 1920s on – 
to underwrite second generation integration in the northern cities. We finish with a contrast 
with the centralised polity of New Zealand (also a liberal market economy with a liberal 
welfare state and a competitive political system), with Māori people representing a broadly 
similar proportion of the population and with a similar migration into Auckland also 
employment-demand driven, but with quite different results as far as violent crime and 
punishment were concerned.  
 
We stress the tentative nature of much our argument in a paper designed to provoke 
discussion.  Our justification is that we see these directions as useful in embedding crime 
and punishment into a more general political-economic framework. 
 
1 Modern Political-Economic Institutions and the History of Industrialisation in the 
US and Europe 
 
1.1 Modernisation and the centralization of state power in (most) advanced 
economies 
 
Most of the modern institutional structures of the advanced economies (at least those which 
industrialised in the later 19th century) derive in significant part from the ways in which these 
nations were organised political-economically before industrialisation; and how governments, 
given those political-economic pre-conditions, shaped the institutional infrastructure which 
they saw as necessary for industrialisation (Cusack et al. 2007; Iversen & Soskice 2009).  
 
Economic historians distinguish between three (or four) industrial revolutions corresponding 
to different technology regimes. The (original) ‘industrial’ revolution, based on iron and steam 
gave way in the middle part of the 19th century to the (much more sophisticated) ‘scientific’ 
revolution, based on electricity and large complex ‘Chandlerian’ corporations, morphing 
subsequently into the Fordist system: it is the ‘scientific’ revolution which precipitated major 
institutional change by governments – including change of government structures.  And – as 
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discussed below – when Fordism collapsed in the 1970s and 1980s, advanced economies 
painfully and partially conflictually absorbed the ‘information’ revolution based on Information 
and Communication Technologies (ICT). 
 
The ‘scientific’ revolution (in contrast to the ‘industrial’ revolution) required a great range of 
infrastructural rules and institutions. In the UK and Germany (and the other industrialising 
countries apart from the US), in the context of creation of the great range of public/club goods 
required for ever more sophisticated industrialisation, the second half (or last third) of the 
19th century saw a consolidation of power by national governments.  This consolidation was  
based on disciplined national parties (nationally-based Interessenparteien in Germany; a two 
party system in Britain) and the creation of effective ministries so as to foster control over 
conservative forces of reaction opposed to public goods necessary for industrialisation.  A 
particularly important focus for such opposition was compulsory education, which existing 
elites would have to pay for and which would enable agricultural workers – whose labour was 
crucial to those elites’ power – to leave for industrial jobs, with significant implications for the 
balance of not only the economy but political and social power.  Hence the newly centralising 
political system created rafts of legislation covering finance, accounting, transport, labour, a 
wide range of standards, police/security, sanitation, education.  And – crucially from the point 
of view of our comparison with the US – this included in the UK the establishment of national 
top-down control from Westminster over municipalities, and in the ‘negotiated’ political 
systems of Western Europe such as Germany the institutionalisation of consensus decision-
making between national governments, and regional and local governments.  
 
1.2 The distinctive American path: modernization without centralization 
 
By contrast, the US – via presidential choices in the Republican Ascendency from the 1870s 
on, in cooperation with presidential appointments to the Supreme Court – went in the opposite 
direction. Moreover it did so in spite of the fact that the Republican ascendency was just as 
concerned to industrialise and therefore faced, and needed to solve, similar problems about 
how to create public goods and to foster incentives for their sustenance over time.  But they 
confronted this task under very different institutional preconditions to those in Europe (and 
Canada and Australia). The key and distinctive features of the relevant US political-economic 
history are as follows: 
 
1 A two-region solution: The core conservative opposition to industrialisation was in the 
southern states, but –  instead of removing the conservative opposition to industrialisation in 
the South – Presidents saw this as too costly, for at least two reasons: 
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First, southern states were well organised in a relatively centralised way, at least at 
state level, and were bitterly opposed to industrialisation, which would have eliminated 
cheap black labour; would have led to increased education of the black population; 
and – yet more threatening to white elites – to their political organisation. Given the 
failure of northern-imposed reconstruction by the early 1870s, direct conflict with the 
South was not an attractive proposition.  
Moreover, southern states were not necessary for the industrialisation project (and so 
long as the South accepted common US manufacturing tariffs – to protect developing 
northern industries against European competition4 – they would be forced to buy 
northern goods). 
 
Hence the South remained outside the industrialisation project, and the North had no 
economic reason to impose proper education of Black Americans on southern states. 
                       
In effect, as Gerstle (2015) implies, it paid to leave the South alone (and focus on 
industrialisation only in the North) not only because the southern states were relatively well-
organised politically and highly opposed to industrialisation, but also because the Constitution 
would have rendered unconstitutional interventions in the South in the non-enumerated areas 
– e.g. education – where the South wanted different policies to the northern municipalities, 
implying intense political and even potentially military conflict.  The solution was not to force 
the southern states to industrialise (potentially accepting large factories and raising 
educational standards of black people, or – worse from the point of view of southern elites – 
their political organisation); but rather simply to require that they accept tariff barriers and 
hence buy manufactured goods from the North. 
  
Note further that this settlement implied that – in contrast to the UK, which neutered Lords’ 
opposition with reform legislation such as that of 1867 and 1884 – the US did not eliminate 
conservative opposition in the 19th century: rather, it contained it within a particular region.  
 
2 Local autonomy for education: The Presidency saw that (leaving aside down-trodden 
agricultural workers) northern cities and counties had strong autonomous incentives to 
develop universal elementary (and later high-school) education (Lindert & Williamson 2016), 
for at least two reasons: 
 
                                                          
4
 Ironically from the later perspective of the Washington Consensus. 
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First, given flexible labour markets, education was key to income levels as far as local 
median voters were concerned. 
 
Second, municipalities needed (at least semi) educated workforces to attract large 
corporations. 
 
Hence the education system in the US developed as a locally autonomous system based on 
local democratic choice and produced generally effective education (at least outside the 
South).  (And in any case, as pointed out above, the Presidency had no constitutional powers 
to impose universal elementary education.) 
 
3 Autonomy for municipalities and counties: The absence of effective federal bureaucracies 
covering the US implied a major role for municipalities, especially large ones; in most of the 
northern states in the 19th century, municipalities were significantly more important 
administratively than the states (see e.g. Novak (1996) for evidence in relation to policing 
powers being given by state governments to cities); in Novak’s words, ‘[i]n contrast to the 
modern ideal of the state as a centralised bureaucracy, the [prevailing 19th century US 
conception of the] well -regulated society emphasised local control and autonomy’ (Novak 
1996: 237).  This reflected the historical origins, in much of the Northern US, of government 
being based in cities. 
 
As argued by Richard Bensel (2000),  key to the dynamics favouring a de facto grant of major 
autonomy to big cities in the interests of industrial development was that the Supreme Court 
could impose the Interstate Commerce clause, suitably interpreted, so that local areas, and 
indeed big cities, did not put up local tariffs and controls on competition.  
 
Therefore – and this seems critical for American industrialisation – big cities had to attract 
large corporations (who could bring wealth and employment) by providing labour forces which 
were educated and non-unionised. Cities further took on the role of educating the necessary 
migrant inflows in the 19th century and guaranteeing to the corporations that unionisations 
and strikes would be controlled by the city in exchange for migrant votes (see also Gerstle 
2015). 
 
Police powers were, of course, given to states in the Constitution; but de facto they were 
passed on in large part to municipalities (and counties) by states. Hence the notion of state 
power as devoted to ‘the people’s welfare’ and the incipient development of something 
approaching a welfare state in the period before the civil war, decisively gave way to a system 
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based on individual rights and adversarial legalism after it (Novak 1996).  The states had 
relatively weak administrative capacity ab initio, with state politicians from powerful cities not 
prepared to cede it to them: the location of state capitals in small towns represented an 
attempt to spread power in this context of city (and to some extent county) primacy.  
 
4 Significant autonomy was given to Chandlerian giant corporations to create internally the 
public goods (accounting, logistics, marketing systems, research). In Europe (including 
Britain), by contrast, nation states played a much greater role in developing the infrastructure 
necessary for industrialisation.  Indeed the federal government simply lacked the institutional 
and legal capacity to develop such infrastructure, at least until the mid 20th century:  as 
Gerstle (2015) argues, the Constitution implied that central, national power had to be 
exercised by subterfuge via strategies such as exemption from constitutional restraint, 
surrogate delegation of responsibility, or privatisation/action through contracting out of what 
in other systems would be seen as core governmental functions, creating in effect a hybrid 
public/ private governance structure.  No wonder that the US encountered special difficulties 
in crafting, let alone enforcing, centralised policies of redistribution or capacity-building able 
to tackle the instantiation of radical levels of inequality in first two thirds of the 19th century 
(Lindert & Williamson 2016).  
 
Bensel (2000) argues that the Supreme Court, loaded with judicial appointments (under the 
Republican Ascendency) from the highly successful railroad operations, understood the 
possibility of great economies of scale and scope from giant corporations if they had freedom 
to dominate markets.  This led to sophisticated Court interpretations of the Clayton and 
Sherman anti-monopoly legislation, with the President using breakup powers only when 
companies failed to develop the desired economies of scale and scope.  In effect, the 
Republican Ascendency Presidency used the Supreme Court to deploy the Interstate 
Commerce clause to prevent protectionist behaviour by states or cities; and also to take away 
powers from federal as well as state and city levels to regulate industrial relations (and allow 
it to become object of legislation).  This then forced cities to compete for the giant corporations 
and mould labour markets to their requirements.  
 
5 The ‘deal’ for cities:  The incentive structure for party bosses in big cities was broadly then 
to absorb immigrants, in the 1880s to 1910s and early 1920s (largely from Southern Europe, 
especially Calabria, from Eastern Europe and Russia, especially Jews); this was the second 
wave of  19th-century immigration (after the earlier first-wave English, Irish, Germans and 
Scandinavians).  The city bosses wanted large companies to bring prosperity to the cities, 
raising the price of property and creating employment. As the immigrants moved in, they 
either had political leadership or organisation from their homeland, or joined in already 
partially established migrant groups; and implicit bargains were struck between their leaders 
(or organisers) and city bosses (within the so-called ‘Tammany Hall’ system), exchanging 
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employment and education for their votes. The assumption is that they had some political 
organisation or political leadership (Catholic priests and Rabbis for exampe) with whom the 
city bosses had to negotiate with.  (We will argue that this deal was not fully available to 
African-Americans who migrated north from 1916 through 1970 to fill the manufacturing 
demand for labour when European migration slowed.)  
 
This leads us to propose a ‘radical’ hypothesis: Given the huge investments these 
corporations made, they needed to feel protected by the political system; hence the ability to 
invest in politicians at all levels was of great importance.  (From this perspective, a reasonable 
hypothesis would be that British companies – who could not invest in politicians because 
individual politicians had no significant influence – were less prepared to make massive long-
term investments in same way as giant US corporations: further work is needed to pin down 
this assessment, though it is supported by our research so far.) Moreover, cities, given their 
major role in policy-making, wanted protection from the broader federal and state political 
system. 
 
6 Hence: The party system remained undisciplined and non-federal:  indeed, this whole 
system described above worked precisely because there was not a disciplined federal party 
system.  Rather, the party system in America (Gerstle 2015: Chapter 5), while operating 
within a national framework and being fostered by federal governments, concentrated its 
organisation and power at the local level, operating through complex local party machines 
and systems of patronage run from city halls.  The US system ensured that both cities and 
corporations could be adequately represented in Congress; and given their role, some 
representation of this sort was necessary (just as, conversely, it was not necessary in the UK 
or other European nation states). 
 
Points 2, 3, 4 and 5 explain this last, sixth point:  in other words it is not that the system 
reflected individual unorganised voters,  but that the party system being decentralised, power 
in Congress itself reflected local interests. The major corporations and big cities needed 
representation at state and federal level and they gained it, de facto, through the locally 
elected representatives in Congress.  This implied that the political system reflected interests 
that were distributed in uncoordinated ways.  In Germany, the giant corporations of the late 
19th century were protected (more or less explicitly) by the Imperial and Land governments; 
in the UK they were not, and the unions were able to stymie the growth of giant research-
oriented companies (ICI and Unilever were the exceptions which did not rely on unionised 
workforces).   
 
In short: the US political-economic system was fundamentally different from the political 
systems of the UK and of Northern Europe in key ways:  negatively, in terms of the absence 
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of highly disciplined political parties driving national policy; positively, in terms of the power 
vested in localities and in corporations as drivers of economic development.  Crucially, note 
that while these differences are decisively shaped by the history and politics of race, notably 
by the legacy of the civil war and of slavery, which shaped the political and cultural world of 
the South, and fostered the regionally bifurcated equilibrium, in terms of both politics and 
economy, which emerged, local autonomy in the US was not driven by race in the simple or 
causally proximate way which is sometimes suggested. Decentralisation was indirectly tied 
to race, but race was mediated by class/political economy, and vice versa, in that it was the 
racial politics of the South which pushed industrialisation north. 
 
 
2 Modern Governmental Institutions and the History of Criminal Justice 
Modernisation in the US and in England and Wales 
 
 
In the first section, we set out the key ways in which the economic and political systems of 
the United States developed in very different ways from those of the United Kingdom and of 
Northern European countries.   In each of these countries, the 19th century saw a gradual 
process of state-building which broadly conformed with a Weberian vision of modernisation 
via centralisation, professionalisation and the construction of governmental bureaucracies.  
In the US, by contrast, this process of state-building remained incomplete (Dale 2011), in an 
outcome which embedded an exceptionally large amount of power – both public and private 
– at the local level.   In this section, we move on to consider the specific ways in which this 
political-economic history shaped, both directly and indirectly, the development of the criminal 
justice institutions which have come to deliver such exceptional levels of punishment.  
Moreover, we will suggest in section 2.4 that the parallel and equally distinctive trajectory of 
American criminal justice both reflected, and fostered, a distinctive set of attitudes relating to 
popular sovereignty and to the legitimacy of state authority which have had a key role in 
producing American patterns of crime and punishment. 
 
Accounts of the development of criminal justice institutions in the United States from the 
colonial era up to the 20th century (Dale 2011; Friedman 1993; Walker 1998) present a 
trajectory which is, superficially, similar to that of the United Kingdom. To paint with very 
broad brush strokes: in both countries, criminal justice before the 19th century was a largely 
local and a significantly lay affair, administered by local officials and enforced in a context of 
dense normative systems of social control rooted in, variously, churches, family structures, 
structures of landowning and the, more or less extreme, disciplinary power over agricultural 
and domestic workers which these structures entailed.  Following the revolution and 
establishment of the independent Republic in 1789, the constitutional settlement was 
interpreted as mandating only limited federal criminalisation powers. Scholars differ as to how 
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determinate the Constitution itself was on this point, with Novak (1996) in particular 
emphasising that the conception of government as existing to assure the public welfare which 
prevailed in the early decades of the Republic embodied a form of welfarism which might 
have  underpinned a very different trajectory, but which was undermined by the move towards 
a more rights-based, legalistic conception of government implicit in the constitutional 
resettlement which followed the Civil War.  But the fact is that neither in the early decades of 
the Republic nor in the period of Reconstruction after the Civil War did there exist a coalition 
with the interest or capacity to reshape that original allocation of police powers to states in 
such as way as to facilitate the development of central governmental institutions of the kind 
which were emerging in Europe.   
 
Nonetheless, during the 19th century, at somewhat different paces, and in the US case, 
significantly shaped by the conflicts which led up to and followed the Civil War in mid-century 
(Aaronson 2014),  both countries saw important developments which conform to a standard 
picture of modernisation in criminal justice: the development of police forces; the emergence 
of the prison conceived as a humane and rationally organised institution geared to reform 
(with the early, though regionally very specific, American penitentiary movement famously 
attracting the admiration of European visitors; Garland 2019); a more organised system and 
hierarchy of courts, assisted in part by the emergence of a more organised and numerous 
legal profession.  But beneath this apparent similarity, there remained deep differences.  The 
enduring differences which have attracted most scholarly analysis are, of course, the 
North/South divide, slavery and post-slavery racial politics; and the persistence of the 
institution of capital punishment.  We return to the question of race and region in the third 
section of the paper.  In this section, we will leave aside the well studied terrain of capital 
punishment (Garland 2010; Steiker 2002; Steiker & Steiker 2016) in order to concentrate on 
three key areas in which the differences between the criminal justice institutions of the US on 
the one hand and of England and Wales on the other can be directly related to the different 
trajectories of their political economies.  There are, first, the development of the police; 
second, arrangements for decisions on and conduct of prosecutions; and third, the role of 
popular justice.   
 
2.1 The Police 
 
In both England and Wales and the United States, the institution of a public police force was 
a highly controversial matter in the early 19th century, evoking as it did models of centralised 
state power which were associated, albeit in somewhat different ways, with tyrannical 
government.  As is well known, Robert Peel’s creation of the Metropolitan Police was 
premised on the idea of a highly disciplined, professional personnel; and whether or not the 
early force entirely conformed to this model, the gradual expansion and development towards 
a nation-wide police force conformed to the idea of an independent force seen as a 
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professional rather than a political organisation.  Of course, the structure of the American 
polity implied that the emergence of policing would be decentralised.  Equally significantly, 
although the development of police forces in the middle of the 19th century at both state and 
city levels was often based, in aspiration, on the Peel model, what emerged was something 
entirely different: forces which were staffed not by men who saw themselves as joining an 
emerging profession, but rather men who were recruited by local officials; who enjoyed no 
job security because their positions might be swept away by the outcome of the next electoral 
context at the relevant city, county or state level; who mostly did not wear uniforms which 
identified them as public servants.  As Friedman in particular has emphasised (1993: 
Chapters 3 & 7), this implied that the police were in effect an arm of local government, a tool 
of local political interests, vulnerable to the sway of political power, and to the temptations of 
various forms of corruption.  Perhaps the most spectacular example  of this would be the well 
known case of the New York Police Department during the era of local machine politics, with 
policing in significant part funded by informal systems of charging for licences, exemptions 
and services, and the police very much in the service of local politicians and in effect part of 
the ‘Tammany Hall’ patronage system.  Despite efforts to further professionalise the police 
throughout the latter part of the 19th century, these important institutional differences 
persisted well into the 20th century, albeit subject to the local variations which are a key 
feature of the American case.  Even amid the reforms of the Progressive era of the early 20th 
century, local political control rather than professional autonomy was the dominant 
characteristic of policing (Walker 1998: Chapter 4).  
 
2.2  Prosecution 
 
At the start of the 19th century, prosecution in both England and Wales and in the United 
States was in lay hands, initiated by private citizens with the assistance of local, lay officials 
such as justices, constables and sherrifs, mediated by the deliberations of grand juries and 
sometimes facilitated by the existence of private collective arrangements such as prosecution 
associations.  In England and Wales,  though the grand jury survived into the 20th century, 
its significance declined.  The gradual development of a nation-wide police force transferred 
much of the responsibility for decision-making and preparation of prosecutions to the police, 
with the cases handled, in the more serious cases – in which lawyers were increasingly 
involved – by ordinary lawyers engaged by the police or, in the case of private prosecutions, 
the victim.  In the US, however, there was a key institutional innovation which was to turn out 
hugely consequential for the development of American criminal justice over the next 150 
years.  This was the invention in the early decades of the 19th century of the public prosecutor 
(Ellis 2012; Friedman 1993: 29–30; Walker 1983: 29, 70–71): a public official, like prosecutors 
in Northern European systems; but locally based, as in England and Wales.  But in the mid 
19th century, one key feature of many states’ institutionalisation of district attorneys 
developed in an entirely different way from either English or European systems.  In the years 
after the Revolution, most states provided for the appointment of prosecutors by judges, 
governors or legislators.  But concerns gradually emerged about the vulnerability of appointed 
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prosecutors to the sway of political patronage, and between 1832 and 1861 almost three 
quarters of states moved to a system of elected rather than appointed prosecutors.  The aim 
– somewhat ironically given what we know about the behavior of prosecutors today – was to 
guarantee their political independence.  As a result of the extraordinarily dense system of 
electoral democracy which the US political economy had spawned, they were of course 
elected at the local level.  Hence, even more directly than the police, they became part of the 
state and local political systems: subject to the sway of electoral discipline at local level and, 
contrary to the intentions of the reformers, very much subject to political influence broadly 
conceived.  With what is arguably the single most important official filter for criminalisation 
exposed to the power of popular opinion in such a disaggregated way, any potential capacity 
to shape a coherent national criminal justice system was undermined, and even that to do so 
at the level of states compromised.  The importance of the sway of local electoral politics on 
prosecution decision making to this day is reflected in Pfaff’s recent (2017) conclusion that a 
move from election to appointment of prosecutors is the single most important reform in terms 
of potential to dismantle mass imprisonment.  
 
2.3 Lay Justice 
  
A third key difference between 19th century developments in English and American criminal 
justice lies in the degree to which social control continued to be exerted by practices of private 
or popular justice (Dale 2011).  It is important not to exaggerate this: historians have shown 
that, even in the relatively centralised British system, practices of local shaming such as 
‘rough music’ persisted, particularly in rural areas, right up to the late 19th century (Conley 
1991).  And, of course, diffused internalised norms and a range of private institutions remain, 
in all countries, more centrally important to compliance and social order than the sanctioning 
practice of formal criminal justice, partial, patchy and sometimes counter-productive as they 
inevitably are.  Petty juries, too, remained central features of each system.  Nonetheless, 
there is strong evidence that a continued reliance on – and attachment to – popular 
sovereignty in the delivery of criminal justice in the US remained at a distinctively high level, 
with significant implications in terms of an incomplete process of modernisaton, 
systematisation, legalisation and even pacification.   
 
Arguably, the sway of public/private hybrid roles such as elected local justices, sherrifs and 
constables, along with the slow and still at the end of the 19th century incomplete 
professionalisation of the police, itself implied a large element of ‘lay’ justice at the heart of 
even state criminal justice, as indeed did the continued role of lay decision-makers in criminal 
cases – something which of course was a feature of both countries’ systems.  But a range of 
other accepted practices and organisations in the United States finds no clear parallel in 
England and Wales.  With weak policing in many parts of the country, private militias 
remained an important residual tool of de facto public control throughout the century, implying 
III Working paper 32                                                         Nicola Lacey and David Soskice 
 
17 
 
 
state and local governmental authorities’ reliance on popular sentiment and support among 
the relevant groups (Dale 2011; Walker 1983). (The link with today’s continuing attachment 
to gun rights is of course significant in this context.)  Mobbing and rioting continued in many 
parts of the country as a form of ‘law and order’ intervention to a degree more analogous with 
18th than with 19th century England; while the horrifying practices of lynching implied vivid 
limits to state and legal standards of criminalisation well into the 20th century.  Equally 
significantly, the creation of vigilance committees, which asserted to themselves the right of 
‘law’ enforcement in many areas of the country,  and which persisted throughout the 19th and 
into the 20th century (Friedman 1993: Chapter 8; Walker 1998: Chapter 2) betoken a lack not 
merely of centralisation but of standardisation and of institutionalisation of the rule of law 
which finds no parallel in the UK or North European countries. Echoing Gerstle’s (2015) and 
Brown’s (2016) diagnosis of a system which relies on privatisation to deliver governmental 
functions, the criminal justice ‘systems’ of late 19th century America amounted to a 
public/private system – a hotch potch of public yet politicised, professional yet not centralised, 
private and uncoordinated, or hybrid organisations, implying radical local variation in both 
institutional structure and outcome.  
 
Perhaps one of the most telling examples here is that of an institution which both systems 
shared: the trial (petty) jury.  In England and Wales, by the 19th century it was already widely 
accepted that the jury was the trier of fact and not of law: and while the continued secrecy of 
jury verdicts makes it hard to assess the extent to which jurors use their discretion to resist 
what they saw, or see, as unfair or otherwise inappropriate convictions or aquittals, the 
characterisation of verdicts ‘against the facts’ as ‘perverse’ implies a view of this residual 
power as a corruption of justice rather than an accepted institutional mechanism.   In the US, 
by contrast, a vigorous assertion of the jury’s right to exercise its prerogative of ‘nullification’ 
of unjust verdicts (Dale 2011: Chapters 3 & 5) persists to this day, a powerful symbol of a 
continued attachment to popular standards as the ultimate arbiter of criminal justice and a 
leveler of state power.  That the fact/law distinction is a contestable one does not undermine 
the important difference in attitudes to jurors’ muscular use of their discretion in the two 
countries.  
 
2.4  Mentalities 
 
It is not difficult to see how the fragmented and significantly privatised trajectory of the US 
political economy in the decades of industrialisation would have conduced to this similarly 
decentralised and public/private structure of criminal justice.  But a further and interesting 
question arises about the political mentalities which these associated institutional structures 
both reflected and reinforced.  As many historians have noted (e.g. Gerstle 2015), American 
Republicanism has been shaped by a strong attachment to freedom and a suspicion of 
centralised power which has as its correlate a strong attachment to popular sovereignty and 
to the development of institutions which are highly responsive.  In this context, Roth’s (2009; 
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2018) fascinating and magisterial study of patterns of homicide is instructive.  Over the whole 
sweep of American history, and on the basis of a meticulous analysis of a range of sources, 
Roth finds that the level of homicide is positively related to periods of high social conflict and 
to low levels of trust in government and faith in strong national identity. These striking 
correlations raise important questions about the extent to which American polity and society 
has been able to sustain levels of informal social norms and mechanisms of informal social 
control on the same sort of level as other countries with more central and, especially, 
coordinated systems (Garland 2017; 2019).  This in turn invites the thought that there is a 
strong correlation between not just two but three features of the US social landscape; the 
institutional structure of political economy and of criminal justice; the informal institutions of 
social control; and social mentalities in relation to state and, in particular, federal state power.   
 
Much of the contemporary scholarship on American exceptionalism in crime and punishment 
is, understandably, preoccupied by the impact of the belated entry of the federal government 
into a more concerted national state-building effort in the middle decades of the 20th century, 
and of the implications for federal involvement in crime control of the programmes associated 
with both the New Deal under President Roosevelt and of the Great Society under President 
Johnson (Gottschalk 2006; Schoenfeld 2018).  This scholarship argues that the federal 
resources devoted crime control during this period – much of it, of course, taking the form of 
grants to states, creating decentralised resources many of which were further delegated to 
the local level (Feeley & Sarat 1980; Lacey & Soskice 2018: 81–85) – created the 
infrastructure which facilitated the build-up of mass imprisonment from the 1970s on.  This 
argument is persuasive, and we do not dispute it.  But it does not in itself explain the 
incentives for that build-up, or how it was delivered in large part by decision-making at local 
as much as state level.   Our argument, in other words, is that this accretion of capacity, 
prompted and funded in significant part by the federal government, was a condition, but not 
a moving cause of the acceleration of American exceptionalism in criminal justice outcomes 
after 1970. 
 
3 The History and Politics of Race 
 
In this section, we consider how far the distinctive – and associated - historical trajectories of 
political economy and criminal justice in the United States can account for the contemporary 
gross racial disproportionality in patterns of crime, criminal victimisation and punishment – 
and how far the history and politics of race have in themselves shaped America’s political 
and criminal justice trajectory. Race and racism have long occupied a central place in 
explanations of distinctive American patterns of crime and, especially, punishment (Bennett 
2015; Simon 2017; Tonry 2011), as indeed of social organisation more generally (Katznelson 
1973; 1981; Lieberson 1980; Massey & Denton 1993; Sampson et al. 2018; Schneider & 
Turney 2015; Wilson 1987). And recently, a striking argument has placed race at the heart of 
the explanation of the prison buildup, suggesting that mass imprisonment is in effect an 
III Working paper 32                                                         Nicola Lacey and David Soskice 
 
19 
 
 
analogue of the vicious ‘Jim Crow’ system geared to perpetuating the structural exclusion of 
Black Americans from full citizenship in the first half of the 20th century (Alexander 2012; cf. 
Schoenfeld 2018). In this section, while acknowledging that it would be foolish to deny that 
the history and politics of race have been key contributors to America’s distinctive patterns of 
crime and punishment, we suggest that our historical and comparative analysis undermines 
the suggestion that race is the primary, let alone the exclusive, explanation for American 
exceptionalism in crime and punishment. We argue, moreover, that the impact of race has 
itself been decisively shaped by the dynamics of local autonomy which emerged from 
America’s distinctive political and economic history – itself indirectly but importantly shaped 
by race. 
 
While the over-representation of certain demographic groups, notably young black men, is a 
marked phenomenon in the criminal justice systems of many countries, with the disproportion 
in England and Wales, for example, corresponding to that in the United States (Tonry 2014).  
But the much larger population of African Americans in the United States than of Black Britons 
in the United Kingdom entails a more noticeable impact on overall prison numbers, as well 
as a larger social and political problem in absolute terms: on Bureau of Justice Statistics from 
2018, if people of all races and ethnic origins were incarcerated at the same rate as white 
people, the number of sentenced male prisoners would be reduced by approximately 52.7%, 
from 1,353,850 to 640,075.   Despite drops in US prison rates between 2010 and 2016 and 
some reduction in racial disparities, these remain very stark: in 2016 the national 
imprisonment rate for males was 848 per 100,000; 401 for white males; 1,093 for Hispanic 
males; and 2,417 for black males (Bureau of Justice Statistics 2018: 15). These factors, it 
might be argued, are in themselves sufficient to lead us to expect that the United States would 
display especially acute penal severity. Moreover, the War on Drugs has undoubtedly 
accentuated the racially skewed patterns of law enforcement since the 1980s, not least 
because of the use of drug arrests as ‘proxies’ for enforcement of more serious offenses that 
present greater problems of proof (Stuntz 2011). 
 
But, as James Forman (2012; 2017) has persuasively argued, an explanation founded wholly 
in racial exclusion encounters significant difficulties. It struggles to  explain the class aspects 
of racial patterns of crime and punishment, with mass imprisonment, unlike Jim Crow, leaving 
a substantial black middle class virtually untouched and, conversely, having a significant 
impact on poor whites and Hispanics: see also Gottschalk 2015: Chapters 6 & 7.  It also fails 
to explain black political support for tough crime policies, as witnessed by policy choices in 
the black-majority jurisdiction of Washington, DC (Forman 2012: 38–44); or the role of violent 
crime – in which Black Americans are disproportionately both victims and offenders – in 
moving crime up the political agenda from the mid-1960s.  
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A historical analysis reinforces the call of scholars like Forman and Gottschalk for a more 
nuanced and indeed pluralist interpretation. In arguing that race has not been the sole or 
overriding cause of mass incarceration or of racial disproportionality in criminalisation and in 
criminal victimisation in America, we are not arguing that the history and politics of race do 
not have large and continuing effects. The stark facts of racial inequality in the United States, 
as graphically charted by scholars like Wilson (1987), Massey & Denton (1993), Loury (2003), 
Western (2006), Lerman & Weaver (2014), Alexander (2012), and Schoenfeld (2018) are 
clearly direct and indirect consequences of southern racism in (and before) the 19th century 
(Aaronson 2014; Charles 2006: Chapter 6), exacerbated by the two-region political 
settlement after the Civil War which locked those consequences in place even after slavery’s 
demise. The US is undoubtedly still living with the continuing echoes of slavery, of the Jim 
Crow regime which replaced it, and of a host of associated institutional arrangements, notably 
in relation to policing (Muller 2012) and to residential segregation (Smith 2012; Trounstine 
2018).  Differing age demographics between racial groups may also have had some impact 
(Campbell & Vogel 2019).  Moreover the continuing existence of racist attitudes – which 
persist of course not just in the United States but also in the United Kingdom and in New 
Zealand, to take just two broadly comparable cases – have been thrown into ever greater 
relief, particularly for a white public, in the political context of the Trump era and thanks to the 
efforts of social movements such as Black Lives Matter.  
 
But the echoes of baleful historical forces have been amplified by the fragmented structure 
of the American political system.  Continuing segregation, particularly in the industrial cities 
of the Northeast and Midwest, along with the lack of any real educational escape for the truly 
disadvantaged, have been consequences of local median voters’ choices under conditions 
of radical local autonomy (Sampson 2019; Sampson et al. 2018; Trounstine 2018). And this 
has been exacerbated by the social disorganisation attendant on the demographic 
implications of mass migration and, later, the gradual exit, whether to suburbs or to 
contiguous areas (Pattillo-McCoy 1999), of a sizeable number of the black middle class 
(Wilson 1987). In addition, the ‘centrifugal ‘ (Gerstle 2015: 154–5) dynamics set up by local 
autonomy have driven demographic divisions within as well as between racial groups 
(Charles 2006), just as they have given local black political leaders disincentives to combat 
segregation (Massey & Denton 1993: 153–60, 213–15). Once divisions of disadvantage 
become mapped onto space, the possibilities of reversal – notably through educational 
achievement – steadily diminish. And these local institutional arrangements that have, often 
through zoning, fostered the spatial concentration of disadvantage crucially predate the great 
migrations of Black Americans of the early and mid-20th century. 
 
The resulting tragedy of entrenched segregation did not happen on the same scale in 
systems where policing, planning, and education policy are developed at the national level. 
For example, the degree of racial residential segregation in America has been shown to be 
substantially higher than that in the United Kingdom, Australia, or New Zealand (Johnston et 
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al. 2005: Figure 4; 2007). This can hardly be thought to be because other Anglo-Saxon 
countries are strangers to racism or indeed to discriminatory public policy. The United 
Kingdom introduced an implicitly color-based ‘nationality’ (i.e. immigration) act in 1971 and 
comprehensive race discrimination legislation only in 1976, 12 years after the Civil Rights 
Act. Australia abolished the last elements of the white Australia immigration policy which had 
prevailed since the beginning of the 20th century only in 1973.  Recent spikes in hate crime 
and other manifestations of racism in the wake of the 2016 referendum on the UK’s 
membership of the EU, the findings of racial disproportion across the criminal justice system 
of the Lammy Review (Lammy 2017), as well as scandals such as the exposure of the 
appalling treatment of members of the ‘Windrush Generation’ by the UK Border Agency, 
confirm the persistence of virulent forms of discrimination based on race.  But, even post-
devolution, the centralisation of criminal justice powers to Westminster and Holyrood allows 
these issues to be addressed at a national level, and control of not only criminal justice but 
also housing and education policy remains at national level; and our argument is that this 
long term difference helps to explain the fact that penal disprortionality has not been 
accompanied, as it has in the US, by an incontinent explosion of imprisonment and other 
forms of penal control, nor by a comparable explosion of violence.  Perhaps most striking of 
all, New Zealand, whose Māori  and Polynesian populations are roughly comparable to the 
black American population in terms of both proportionate size and historic, social and 
economic disadvantage and are overrepresented in the prison population to a similar degree 
(Department of Corrections 2007), had an explicitly white New Zealand immigration policy 
until 1986. While never subjected to slavery, the Māori people were expropriated by British 
colonialism and struggled for over a century for compensation and proper recognition of their 
culture. Yet Māori and other minority peoples have been integrated into the cities in which 
they are most populous, notably Auckland, about twice as completely (in terms of residential 
segregation) as African-Americans. 
 
In America’s radically decentralised system, it has proved impossible to frame and find 
consistent support for political strategies to combat segregation; and at various points, 
notably the 1930s, it must be admitted that racially motivated federal policies, such as the 
discriminatory rules about mortgage eligibility, made things even worse.  Hence racial 
disadvantage has continued to accumulate, and to radiate out from the criminal justice 
system to produce very wide highly inegalitarian social effects (Lee et al. 2015; Western 
2006).  Indeed, one might even say that it is not primarily racial dynamics which today cause 
segregation but rather the segregation-promoting dynamic of local politics that consolidates 
the problem of black and Hispanic disadvantage. American localism cannot be argued to 
have been motivated directly by racism; but the long history of racism in the United States 
was a key indirect driver or the localism which today consolidates racial disadvantage.  For 
the persistence of segregation and racial disadvantage in the North is indeed a consequence 
of the path to industrialisation via the two-region solution, which left black people to their fate 
in the South, and placed reliance on mechanisms of industrial development in the North which 
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depended on local autonomy and control, as well as on trade with the non-industrialised 
South.   
 
Local autonomy has been a key element in the government of the United States since the 
early 19th century, at least outside the southern states. Moreover, as we saw in the first 
section of this paper, the local autonomy of cities and townships was critical in driving 
economic development outside the South. This contrasted with the push in the United 
Kingdom and its settler colonies toward centralisation. Equally, the system of ethnic 
segregation of migrants in the North and the Midwest long predates the Black Migration 
(Katznelson 1981). But earlier migrants had significantly higher education (Lieberson 1980: 
123–199) and more developed institutions of social organisation: the Irish, Poles, and Italians 
had the hierarchical Roman Catholic Church; Germans and Swedes brought a strong 
tradition of local associational organisation with them to the United States (Lieberson 1980: 
19–99). These traditions and forms of association in turn made it relatively easy for ‘city hall’ 
governments to incorporate them into employment and the education system. These groups 
accordingly found it easier to find a position within the system of ‘city trenches’ which formed 
the 19th-century system of local government in the United States and were gradually 
integrated in both residential and employment terms. But a key drawback emerged in the 
form of the movement aiming to reform the ‘Tammany Hall’ system – a movement which was 
hostile to the coalition and integration/education deal between city bosses and second wave 
immigrants. This then led to political pressure to close immigration in early 1920s.  With the 
combination of the reform movement and the closure of immigration, the Northern factories 
– ironically – came to rely on black migration from the South;  but this did not translate into 
the incorporation of black migrants into Northern local government as it had in relation to 
earlier migrant groups.  The accumulated deficits attendant on Southern proscription of 
education and political organization, as well as continuing racism in the north, had a 
deleterious effect on black American progress: the gradual demise of the ‘Tammany Hall’ 
system up to the 1940s did not help.  And, as Katznelson (1981) has charted, after the 
breakdown of city trenches, continuing black segregation made it hard for the black 
Americans to find stable positions in local government; and, as a further complicating factor, 
in so far as black local politicians had stable power bases, this often depended on residential 
segregation, hence compromising their commitment to measures to combat segregation 
(Douglas 2005; Massey & Denton 1993; Pattillo 2007). 
 
The legacy of both slavery and the governmental structure of the South right through to the 
end of the Jim Crow era accordingly had two effects which are of special importance in 
explaining why it turned out to be so difficult to achieve real integration of black Americans, 
particularly in the cities of the North and Midwest. First, the southern regime impeded the 
development of any political structuring of black society – a fact which had significant long-
term implications for social disorganisation. And second, the southern regime restricted the 
educational development of black people. We argue that it is these features, rather than, as 
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Wilson (1987) suggests, the sheer size of the Black Migration, which have had such 
damaging implications for the chances of black integration in the North. This historical legacy 
was then magnified by the dynamics set up by strong local autonomy and weak national 
capacity for policy development and implementation. The collapse of Fordism happened at a 
disastrous time vis-à-vis black integration, and local autonomy made things decisively worse 
by allowing the median voter to zone poverty and disadvantage spatially and educationally. 
This set up a polarising dynamic in which the more advantaged have an interest in, and, given 
local autonomy, the power to, separate themselves ever more completely – spatially, 
culturally, educationally, economically – from the disadvantaged. Since Black and Hispanic 
Americans are markedly overrepresented among the disadvantaged, they suffer especially 
from these dynamics. In this light, mass imprisonment looks dispiritingly like the extreme 
policy manifestation of a much more widespread institutional (as well as social) dynamic. 
Pattillo-McCoy’s (1999) refinement of Wilson’s (1987) thesis about outmigration of the black 
middle class – often into liminal areas between white suburbs and inner city – reinforces the 
idea that they too would have been more affected than the white middle class by the collapse 
of Fordism. 
 
The key problem therefore lies in the local political institutions that have driven and sustained 
socioeconomic segregation and in doing so subverted not only the ideals of the Civil Rights 
Movement but any real prospect of alleviating poverty and disadvantage in the absence of 
state or federal initiatives. In the face of these dynamics, the main tools for national 
policymaking and for the implementation of national policy at the local level – the provision of 
federal grants to localities, the institution of regulatory agencies to produce and/or monitor 
standards, and the enforcement of constitutional standards in the courts – have proved weak 
or even impotent. Local administration of federal grants subjects federal policy to local 
political dynamics. Regulatory agencies tend to be weak and have in any event become less 
salient in the wake of the ‘new federalism’ (Feeley & Sarat 1980) and of budget cuts. And 
litigation is protracted, expensive, divisive, uneven in its impact, poorly adapted to tackle 
broad issues of policy or principle reaching beyond the specific case, and unhelpfully trained 
on issues of process rather than issues of substance (Kagan 2001). In this context, even 
criminalisation of forms of discrimination often operates merely as symbolic politics, diverting 
attention from, and having little power to address structural causes of disadvantage 
(Aaronson 2014). Key examples of these pathologies of overreliance on legal enforcement 
include the Gautreaux litigation in Chicago and the drift in litigation challenging state public 
school financing systems and in particular the impact of the varying tax base on education 
provision (Massey & Denton 1993: 14–15, 187, 223–30, 206; cf. Pattillo 2007: 110–14; 
Peterson & Krivo 2010: Chapter 5). Since the Rodriguez case in which the US Supreme Court 
in effect diverted this issue to state courts, there has been a gradual shift from a concern with 
equity to a diluted concern to enforce an obligation merely to provide a baseline of adequate 
education and a reluctance to treat children in poorer school districts as victims of unequal 
protection or to subject local education financing to more than deferential scrutiny for the 
purposes of constitutional review (Nickerson & Deenihan 2003). 
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4 Conclusion 
 
The racial justice to which the Civil Rights Movement aspires remains, alas, distant, as social 
outcomes in education, crime, punishment, and housing all too clearly attest. Our argument 
in this paper has been that the decentralisation and fragmentation of power in the American 
political system, and the political sway which this gives to parochial self-interest, is one 
important reason why that is the case; and that this decentralisation has long historical and 
institutional roots which depend as much on political economy as on the distinctive features 
of the US Constitution.  In conclusion, it is perhaps worth pondering a counterfactual.  
Imagine, if you will, a mid-19th century equivalent of President Trump, who, instead of 
prosecuting a civil war, decided that the solution was to build a wall between North and South 
so as foreclose northward migration – while negotiating a trade deal featuring extensive 
tariffs.  If our argument is right, the institutional structure of the northern political economy 
and criminal justice system would have developed in similar ways to those they followed in 
America’s actual history; and inequalities in crime, punishment and broader social indices 
such as housing and education would nonetheless have eventuated. The fate of Hispanics – 
migrants with unequal access to the forms of education and organisation needed to 
assimilate – for, as King (2000)  has shown, ‘integration’ of migrants, where ‘successful’, has 
always been a form of assimilation – is perhaps suggestive here.  For broadly political-
economic reasons, the American project of nation-state building – even, of pacification – has 
remained, and will now remain, by the standards of other advanced economies with 
democratic political systems, incomplete: as Roth puts it, as compared with its closest 
comparators, the ironically named United States has suffered a ‘failure to coalesce as a 
nation’ (Roth 2009: 300; cf. Garland 2010; 2019).  America’s distinctive patterns of inequality 
– and of racial inequality in particular – are a tragic effect of America’s  distinctive and 
decentralised paths to modernity.   
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